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Abstract
Whether a country’s central bank independence (CBI) status has a lowering effect on inflation is a con-
troversial hypothesis. To date, this question could not be answered satisfactorily because the complex
macroeconomics structure that gives rise to the data has not been adequately incorporated into statis-
tical analyses. We have developed a causal model that summarizes the economic process of inflation.
Based on this causal model and recent data, we discuss and identify the assumptions under which the
effect of CBI on inflation can be identified and estimated. Given these and alternative assumptions we
estimate this effect using modern doubly robust effect estimators, i.e. longitudinal targeted maximum
likelihood estimators. The estimation procedure incorporated machine learning algorithms and was
tailored to address the challenges that come with complex longitudinal macroeconomics data. We
could not find strong support for the hypothesis that a central bank that is independent over a long
period of time necessarily lowers inflation. Simulation studies evaluate the sensitivity of the proposed
methods in complex settings when assumptions are violated, and highlight the importance of working
with appropriate learning algorithms for estimation.
Keywords: causal inference, central bank independence, doubly robust, targeted maximum likelihood
estimation, super learning, inflation, macroeconomics.
∗The views, opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this paper are strictly those of the
authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Swiss National Bank (SNB). The SNB takes no responsibility for
any errors or omissions in, or for the correctness of, the information contained in this paper.
†KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. e-mail: baumann@kof.ethz.ch
‡Institute of Public Health, Medical Decision Making and Health Technology Assessment, UMIT - University for Health
Sciences, Medical Informatics and Technology, Hall in Tirol, Austria and Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology &
Research, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa. e-mail: michael.schomaker@umit.at
§Swiss National Bank and University of Zurich. e-mail: enzo.rossi@snb.ch
ar
X
iv
:2
00
3.
02
20
8v
1 
 [e
co
n.E
M
]  
4 M
ar 
20
20
1 Introduction
The impact of central bank institutional design on real economic outcomes received big attention over the
last three decades. Whether a country’s central bank independence (CBI) can lower inflation and provide
inflation stability is a particular controversial issue. It has been claimed that more than 9,000 works have
been devoted to the investigation of the role of CBI in influencing economic outcomes (Vuletin and Zhu,
2011). After the 2008-09 Global Financial Crisis, the debate on the optimal design of monetary policy
authorities has become even more intense.
The statistical and economic literature is rich in studies that evaluate the relationship between CBI
and inflation. A common approach is to treat countries as units in a linear regression model where
inflation (percentage change of the Consumer Price Index (CPI)) is the outcome and a binary CBI index
and several economic and political variables are covariates. While many studies have found that an
independent central bank may lower inflation (Grilli et al., 1991; Cukierman et al., 1992; Alesina and
Summers, 1993; Klomp and De Haan, 2010a,b; Arnone and Romelli, 2013), other studies that used a
broader range of characteristics of a nation’s economy could not find such a relationship (Cargill, 1995;
Fuhrer, 1997; Oatley, 1999). Moreover, there have been studies suggesting that the effect of CBI on
inflation can only be seen during specific time periods (Klomp and De Haan, 2010a) or only in developed
countries (Klomp and De Haan, 2010b; Neyapti, 2012; Alpanda and Honig, 2014).
There are numerous articles which have pointed out the weaknesses that come with simple cross-sectional
regression approaches when evaluating the effect of CBI on inflation. First, the problem at hand is
longitudinal in nature and only an appropriate panel setup may be suitable to estimate the (long-term)
effect of CBI on inflation. Second, the question of interest is essentially causal: i.e. what (average)
inflation would we observe in 10 years’ time, if –from now on– each country’s monetary institution would
have an independent central bank compared to a situation where the central bank would not have been
independent? Yet, the above mentioned cross-sectional regression approaches do not use any causal
considerations in their analyses.
Some more recent work has attempted to overcome at least parts of these problems. For example, Crowe
and Meade (2007, 2008) use a panel data setup with two time intervals and Klomp and De Haan (2010b)
work with a random coefficient panel model. Other authors, e.g. Walsh (2005), acknowledge that not only
current CBI may cause future inflation, but also that current inflation is possibly related to the future
CBI status. Several authors have thus tried to use instrumental variable approaches, but were unable to
find strong instruments (Crowe and Meade, 2008; Ja´come and Va´zquez, 2008).
It is clear that evaluating the effect of CBI on inflation requires a longitudinal causal estimation approach.
However, it has been shown repeatedly that standard regression approaches are typically not suitable to
answer causal questions, in particular when the setup is longitudinal and when the confounders of the
outcome-intervention relationship are affected by previous intervention decisions (Daniel et al., 2013).
There are at least three methods to evaluate the effect of longitudinal (multiple time-point) interventions
on an outcome in such complex situations: 1) inverse probability of treatment weighted approaches
(IPTW, Robins et al., 2000), 2) standardization with respect to the time-dependent confounders (i.e.
g-formula-type approaches, Robins, 1986; Bang and Robins, 2005), and 3) doubly robust methods, such
as targeted maximum-likelihood estimation (TMLE, Van der Laan and Rose, 2011), which can be seen
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as a combination and generalization of the other two approaches.
Longitudinal targeted maximum likelihood estimation (LTMLE; van der Laan and Gruber, 2012) is a
doubly robust estimation technique which requires the fitting of models for the outcome and intervention
mechanisms, iteratively at each time point. With LTMLE, the causal quantity of interest (such as an
average treatment effect (ATE)) is estimated consistently if either the iterated outcome regressions or the
intervention mechanisms are estimated consistently. LTMLE, like other doubly robust methods, has the
advantage over other approaches that it can more readily incorporate machine learning methods while
retaining valid statistical inference. Recent research has shown that this is important if correct model
specification is difficult; such as when dealing with complex longitudinal data, potentially of small sample
size, where relationships and interactions are most likely highly non-linear and where the number of
variables is large compared to the sample size (Tran et al., 2019; Schomaker et al., 2019).
Using causal inference in economics has a long history, starting with path analyses and potential out-
come language (Tinbergen, 1930; Wright, 1934) and continuing with regression discontinuity analyses
(Hahn et al., 2001), instrumental variable designs (Imbens, 2014), propensity score approaches in the
context of the potential outcome framework (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), among many other methods.
More recently there has been literature advocating the use of doubly robust techniques in econometrics
(Chernozhukov et al., 2018). From the perspective of statistical inference this is a very promising sug-
gestion because the integration of modern machine learning methods in causal effect estimation is almost
inevitable in areas with large number of covariates and complex data-generating processes (Schomaker
et al., 2019).
However, the application of doubly robust effect estimation can be challenging for (macro-)economic data.
First, the causal model that summarizes the knowledge about the data-generating process is often more
complex for economic questions compared to epidemiological ones, where most successful implementations
have been demonstrated so far (Kreif et al., 2017; Decker et al., 2014; Schnitzer, Moodie, van der Laan,
Platt and Klein, 2014; Schnitzer, van der Laan, Moodie and Platt, 2014; Schnitzer, Lok and Bosch, 2016;
Tran et al., 2016; Schomaker et al., 2019; Bell-Gorrod et al., 2019). The task of representing the causal
model in a directed acyclic graph (DAG) becomes particularly challenging when considering how economic
variables interact with each other over time. Thus, to build a DAG, a thorough review of a vast amount of
literature is needed and economic feedback loops need to be incorporated appropriately. Imbens (2019),
who discusses different schools of causal inference and their use in statistics and econometrics, as well as
different estimation techniques, emphasizes this point:
”
[...] a major challenge in causal inference is coming up with the causal model.“
Second, even if a causal model has been developed, identification of an estimand has been established
and data collected, statistical estimation may be non-trivial given the complexity of a particular data set
(Schomaker et al., 2019). If the the sample size is small, potentially smaller than the number of (time-
varying) covariates, recommended estimation techniques can fail and the development of an appropriate
set of learning and screening algorithms is important. The benefits of LTMLE, that is doubly robust effect
estimation in conjunction with machine learning to reduce the chance of model mis-specification, can be
best utilized under a good and broad selection of learners that are tailored to the problem of interest.
Estimating the effect of CBI on inflation is a typical example of a causal inference question which faces all
of the challenges described above. Our paper makes five novel contributions to the literature. i) We discuss
2
identification and estimation for our question of interest – and estimate the effect of CBI on inflation; ii)
we develop a causal model which can be applied to other questions related to macroeconomics in general;
iii) we demonstrate that it is possible to develop a DAG for economic questions, which is important as it
has been argued that ”the lack of adoption in economics is that the DAG literature has not shown much
evidence of the benefits for empirical practice in settings that are important in economics.” (Imbens, 2019);
iv) we demonstrate how to integrate machine learning into complex causal effect estimation, including how
to define a successful learner set when the number of covariates is larger than the sample size and when
there is time dependent confounding with treatment-confounder feedback (Hernan and Robins, 2020); v)
we use simulation studies to study the performance of doubly robust estimation techniques under the
challenges described above.
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we motivate our question of interest, followed by
the description of our framework. Section 4 contains the data analysis, and describes the doubly robust
estimation strategy to estimate the effect of CBI on inflation. In section 5, we conduct simulation studies
motivated by our data analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 Motivating Question: Central Bank Independence and Inflation
When governments have discretionary control over monetary instruments, typically a short-term interest
rate, they can prioritize other policy goals over price stability. For instance, after nominal wages have
been negotiated (or nominal bonds purchased), politicians may be tempted to create inflation to boost
employment and output (gross domestic product, GDP) or to devalue the government debt. This is
referred to as the time-inconsistency problem of commitments to price stability. It results in an inflation
rate higher than what is socially desirable. In order to overcome this outcome, the literature stresses
the benefits of enforced commitments (rules). In particular, Rogoff (1985) has proposed to delegate
monetary policy to an independent and “conservative” central banker to reduce the tendency to produce
high inflation. Conservative means that the central banker dislikes inflation more than the government,
in the sense that (s)he places a greater weight on price stability than the government does. Once central
bankers are insulated from political pressures, commitments to price stability can be credible, helping to
maintain low inflation. Rogoff’s seminal paper had a two-fold effect: stimulating the implementation of
central bank reforms on the policy side, and creating avenues for the design of indices which are suitable
to capture the degree of independence of these institutions on the research side.
Following these ideas, a considerable policy consensus grew around the potential of having independent
central banks to promote inflation stability (Bernhard et al., 2002; Kern et al., 2019). Numerous countries
followed this policy advice. Between 1985 and 2012, and excluding the creation of regional central
banks, there were 266 reforms to the statutory independence of central banks, 236 of which were being
implemented in developing countries. Most of these reforms (77%) strengthened CBI (Garriga, 2016).
However, in spite of the broad impact of this policy advice, the empirical evidence backing it is still
controversial. We thus investigate the effect of CBI on inflation with a causal framework that treats
countries as units in a longitudinal (panel) setup. The data set we use in our analysis have been created
specifically for this purpose, and extends the data set from Baumann et al. (2019).
3
3 Methodological Framework
3.1 Notation
We consider panel data with n units studied over time (t = 0, 1, . . . , T ). At each time point t we observe
an outcome Yt, an intervention of interest At and several time-dependent covariates L
j
t , j = 1, . . . , q,
collected in a set Lt = {L1t , . . . , Lqt}. Variables measured at the first time point (t = 0) are denoted as
L0 = {L10, . . . , Lq00 } and are called “baseline variables”. The intervention and covariate histories of a unit
i (up to and including time t) are A¯t,i = (A0,i, . . . , At,i) and L¯
s
t,i = (L
s
0,i, . . . , L
s
t,i), s = 1, ..., q, respectively,
with q, q0 ∈ N.
We are interested in the counterfactual outcome Y a¯tt,i that would have been observed at time t if unit i
had received, possibly contrary to the fact, the intervention history A¯t,i = a¯t. For a given intervention
A¯t,i = a¯t, the counterfactual covariates are denoted as L¯
a¯t
t,i. If an intervention depends on covariates, it is
dynamic. A dynamic intervention dt(L¯t) = d¯t assigns treatment At,i ∈ {0, 1} as a function L¯t,i. If L¯t,i is
the empty set, the treatment d¯t is static. We use the notation A¯t = d¯t to refer to the intervention history
up to and including time t for a given rule d¯t. The counterfactual outcome at time t related to a dynamic
rule d¯t is Y
d¯t
t,i , and the counterfactual covariates at the respective time point are L¯
d¯t
t,i.
3.2 Likelihood
If we assume a time-ordering of Lt → At at each time point, use YT as the outcome, and define Yt,
t < T , to be contained in Lt, the data can be represented as n iid copies of the following longitudinal
data structure:
O = (L0, A0,L1, A1, . . . ,LT−1, AT−1, YT )
iid∼ P0
For the given ordering, we can write the respective likelihood L (O) as
p0(Oi) = p0(L0,i, A0,i,L1,i, A1,i, . . . ,LT−1,i, AT−1,i, YT,i)
= p0(YT,i|A¯T−1,i, L¯T−1,i)× p0(AT−1|L¯T−1,i, A¯T−2,i)
×p0(LT−1|A¯T−2,i, L¯T−2,i)× . . .× p0(L0,i)
= p0(YT,i|A¯T−1,i, L¯T−1,i)
×
T−1∏
t=0
p0(At,i|L¯t,i, A¯t−1,i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
g0,At
×
T−1∏
t=0
p0(Lt,i|A¯t−1,i, L¯t−1,i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
q˜0,Lt
 .
In the above factorization, p0(·) refers to the density of P0 (with respect to some dominating measure)
and A−1 := L−1 := ∅. If an order for Lt is given, e.g. L1t → . . . → Lqt , a more refined factorization is
possible. In line with the notation of other papers (e.g. Tran et al., 2019), we define the q-portion of
the likelihood to contain the outcome as well: q0,Lt := q˜0,Lt × p0(YT,i|A¯T−1,i, L¯T−1,i). Similarly, we define
g0 :=
∏T
t=0 g0,At and q0 :=
∏T
t=0 q0,Lt .
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3.3 Statistical Model
In line with the notation of Section 3.2, we consider a statistical model M = {P = q × g : q ∈ Q, g ∈ G }
for the true distribution P0 that requires minimal (parametric) assumptions. In contrast to many medical
applications we do not force restrictions onto this model; that is, At and Yt are not deterministically
determined for any given data history. Once an intervention is implemented it can be stopped at any
time point, and potentially started again. Similarly, the outcome can be observed at any time-point and
we do not assume that censoring is possible.
3.4 Causal Model
Causal assumptions about the data-generating process are encoded in the model MF . This non-
parametric (structural equation) model states our assumptions about the time-ordering of the data as
well as the causal mechanism that gave rise to the data. So far, it relates to
YT = fYT (A¯T−1, L¯T−1, UYT )
Lt = fLt(A¯t−1, L¯t−1,ULt) : t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1
At = fAt(L¯t, A¯t−1, UAt) : t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1
where U := (UYT ,ULt , UAt) are unmeasured variables from some underlying distribution PU . For now,
we do not make any assumptions regarding PU . However, in the data example further below, we need
to enforce some restrictions on this distribution. The functions fO(·) are (deterministic) non-parametric
structural equations that assume that each variable may be affected only by variables measured in the
past, and not those which are measured in the future. Section 4.3 refines the causal model for the
data-generating process of the motivating question, and represents any additional assumptions made in
a DAG.
3.5 Causal Target Parameter and Identifiability
In this paper, we focus on the differences of intervention specific means, i.e. in target parameters like
ψj,k = E(Y
d¯jt
T )− E(Y
d¯kt
T ), j 6= k . (1)
If we set the intervention according to a static or dynamic rule (A¯t = d¯
l
t for ∀t) with l ∈ {j, k} in the
causal model MF , we obtain the post-intervention distribution P
d¯lt
0 . The counterfactual outcome Y
d¯lt
T is
the one that would have been observed had At been set deterministically to 0 or 1 according to rule d¯
l
t.
We thus restrict the set of possible interventions to those where the intervention is binary At,i ∈ {0, 1}.
It has been shown that target parameters of the form (1) can be identified under the (partly untestable)
assumptions of consistency, conditional exchangeability and positivity which are defined below. More
specifically, it follows from the work of Bang and Robins (2005) and van der Laan and Gruber (2012)
that given these three assumptions, using the iterative conditional expectation rule, and for the particular
time-ordering as defined in Section 3.2, we can write the target parameter as
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ψj,k = E(Y
d¯jt
T )− E(Y
d¯kt
T )
= E(E( . . .E(E(YT |A¯T−1 = d¯jT−1, L¯T−1)|A¯T−2 = d¯jT−2, L¯T−2 ) . . . |A¯0 = d¯j0,L0 )|L0 ) )−
E(E( . . .E(E(YT |A¯T−1 = d¯kT−1, L¯T−1)|A¯T−2 = d¯kT−2, L¯T−2 ) . . . |A¯0 = d¯k0,L0 )|L0 ) ) . (2)
The assumptions of consistency, conditional exchangeability and positivity have been discussed in the
literature in detail (Daniel et al., 2011, 2013; Robins and Hernan, 2009; Young et al., 2011; Tran et al.,
2019). Briefly, consistency is the requirement that Y d¯tT = YT if A¯t−1 = d¯t−1 and L¯
d¯t
t = L¯t if A¯t−1 = d¯t−1.
Conditional exchangeability requires the counterfactual outcome under the assigned treatment rule to be
independent of the observed treatment assignment, given the observed past: Y d¯tT
∐
At−1|L¯t−1, A¯t−2 for
∀A¯t = d¯t, L¯t = l¯t, ∀t; and positivity says that each unit should have a positive probability of continuing
to receive the intervention according to the assigned treatment rule, given that this has been done so
thus far, and irrespective of the covariate history: P (At = d¯t|L¯t = l¯t, A¯t−1 = d¯t−1) > 0 for ∀t, d¯t, l¯t with
P (L¯t = l¯t, A¯t−1 = d¯t−1) 6= 0.
In principle, (conditional) exchangeability can be verified graphically in a DAG using the back-door
criterion (Pearl, 2010; Molina et al., 2014); i.e. by closing all back-door paths and by non-conditioning
on descendants of the intervention. For multiple time-point interventions, a generalized version of this
criterion can be used to verify conditional exchangeability. This requires blocking all back-door paths
from At to YT that do not go through any future treatment node At+1 (Hernan and Robins, 2020).
More generally, it has been suggested to use single world intervention graphs to verify exchangeability,
particularly to evaluate identification for complex dynamic interventions. See Richardson and Robins for
details (Richardson and Robins, 2013) .
3.6 Effect estimation with Longitudinal TMLE
The longitudinal TMLE estimator (van der Laan and Gruber, 2012) relies on equation (2). To estimate
ψj,k, one can separately evaluate each of the two nested expectation terms and integrate out L¯T−1 with
respect to the post-intervention distribution P
d¯lt
0 . To improve inference with respect to ψj,k a targeted
estimation step at each time point yields a doubly robust estimator of the desired target quantity (see
Van der Laan and Rose (2011) or Schnitzer and Cefalu (2017) for details). More specifically, we recur to
the following algorithm for t = T, ..., 1:
1. Estimate Q¯T = E(YT |A¯T−1, L¯T−1) with an appropriate model (for t = T ). If t < T , use the
prediction from step 3d (of iteration t − 1) as the outcome and fit the respective model. The
estimated model is denoted as Qˆ0,t.
2. Now, plug in A¯t−1 = d¯lt−1 based on rule d¯lt and use the fitted model from step 1 to predict the
outcome at time t (which we denote as Qˆ
d¯lt
0,t).
3. To improve estimation with respect to the target parameter, update the initial estimate of step 2
by means of the following regression:
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a) the outcome refers again to the measured outcome for t = T and to the prediction from item 3d
(of iteration t− 1) if t < T .
b) the offset is the original predicted outcome Qˆ
d¯lt
0,t from step 2 (iteration t).
c) the “clever covariate” is defined as:
Ht−1 =
t−1∏
s=0
I(A¯s = d¯s)
g0,At=d¯ls
(3)
with g0,At=d¯ls = P (As = d¯
l
s|L¯ = l¯s, A¯s−1 = d¯ls−1). The estimate of g0,At=d¯ls is denoted as gˆAt=d¯ls .
d) predict the updated (nested) outcome, Qˆ
d¯lt
1,t, based on the model defined through 3a, 3b, and 3c.
This model contains no intercept. Alternatively, the same model can be fitted with Ht−1 as a weight
rather than a covariate (Kreif et al., 2017; Tran et al., 2019). In this case an intercept is required.
We follow the latter approach in our implementations.
4. The estimate for E(Y d¯
l
t
T ) is obtained by calculating the mean of the predicted outcome from step 3d
(where t = 1).
5. Confidence intervals can, for example, be obtained using the vector of the estimated influence curve;
see Tran et al. (2018) for a review of adequate choices.
6. Repeat 1.-5. to estimate E(Y d¯
j
t
T ) and E(Y
d¯kt
T ). Now, ψˆj,k and its corresponding confidence intervals
can be calculated.
3.6.1 Data-Adaptive Estimation for Complex (Macroeconomic) Data
The above estimation procedure is doubly robust which means that the estimator is consistent as long as
either the Q- or the g-models (steps 1 and 3c in the algorithm described above) are estimated consistently
(Bang and Robins, 2005). If both are estimated consistently (at reasonable rates), the estimator is
asymptotically efficient because the construction of the covariate in step 3c guarantees that the estimating
equation corresponding to the efficient influence curve is solved, which in turn yields desirable (asymptotic)
inferential properties (Van der Laan and Rose, 2011; Schnitzer and Cefalu, 2017).
To estimate the conditional expectations in the algorithm one could use (parametric) regression models.
Under the assumption that they are correctly specified, this approach would be valid. However, in the
context of complex macroeconomic data, as in our motivating example below, it is challenging to estimate
appropriate parametric models because of small sample sizes, a large amount of relevant variables and
complex non-linear relationships. Longitudinal TMLE can (in contrast to many competing estimation
techniques) incorporate machine learning algorithms while still retaining valid inference to reduce the pos-
sibility of model mis-specification. However, in the settings presented below machine learning approaches
need to be tailored to the specific problem and address the following challenges:
i) Complexity: macroeconomic relationships are often highly non-linear and with various interactions
of higher order, which need to be modeled in a sophisticated manner while taking into account the
time ordering of the data.
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ii) Dispensable variables: inclusion of covariates into the estimation procedure which are not required
for identification, i.e. do not block any back-door paths, can potentially be harmful even if they are not
colliders or mediators (Schnitzer, Lok and Gruber, 2016); that is, the inclusion of such variables can
increase the finite-sample variance and lead to small estimated probabilities of following a particular
treatment rule given the past, which may be both incorrectly interpreted as positivity violations and
make the updating step in the TMLE algorithm unstable.
iii) p>n: for longitudinal macroeconomics data, the number of parameters is often larger than the
sample size. This is because for long follow-up the whole covariate history needs to be considered,
interactions may be non-linear, and different variables may have different scales and features that
need to be modeled adequately. Consequently, one needs to either reduce the number of parameters
with an appropriate estimation procedure or eliminate variables beforehand using variable screening.
It has been argued that screening of variables is inevitable to facilitate estimation with LTMLE in
many settings (Schnitzer, Lok and Gruber, 2016).
Section 4.5 recommends possible approaches to tackle these challenges in common macroeconomic settings.
4 Data Analysis: Estimating the Effect of Central Bank Independence
on Inflation
4.1 Data
We accessed databases of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to collect annual data
for economic, political and institutional variables. Our outcome of interest is inflation in 2010 (Y2010). All
covariates are measured annually at equidistant points in time for t∗ = 1998, . . . , 2010. The intervention
variable is central bank independence (CBI, At∗) which we define as suggested by Dincer and Eichengreen
(2014): their CBI index measures several dimensions of independence and runs from 0, the lowest level of
independence, to 1, the highest level of independence. It contains considerations such as the independence
of the chief executive officer (CEO) and limits on his/her re-appointment, the bank’s independence in
terms of policy formulation, its objective or mandate, the stringency of limits on lending money to the
public sector, measures of provisions affecting (re)appointment of board members other than the CEO,
restrictions on government representation on the board, and intervention of the government in exchange
rate policy formulation. Our outcome variable is defined as the year-on-year changes (expressed as annual
percentages) of average consumer prices measured by a CPI. A CPI measures changes in the prices of
goods and services that households consume. To calculate CPIs, government agencies conduct household
surveys to identify a basket of commonly purchased items and then track the cost of purchasing this
basket over time. The cost of this basket at a given time, expressed relative to a base year, is the CPI;
and the percentage change in the CPI over a certain period is referred to as consumer price inflation, the
most widely used measure of inflation. Our measured covariates are Lt∗ = {L1t∗ , . . . , L18t∗ } and include a
variety of macroeconomic variables such as money supply, energy prices, economic openness, institutional
variables like central bank transparency and monetary policy strategies, and political variables (See Figure
1, Table 2 and Baumann et al. (2019) for details.). In line with the notation of Section 3 we consider Yt∗ ,
t∗ < T = 2010, to be part of Lt∗ , i.e. we define L8t∗ := Yt∗ .
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Our aim was to include as many countries as possible in our analysis. This entailed a trade-off between
the number of countries and the completeness of the data set. We were able to collect annual data
from 1998 to 2010 for 124 countries for 14 explanatory variables and for the dependent variable Yt∗ . We
further derived growth rates and other indicators from those measured variables, to capture data for all 18
covariates (Lt∗). Some of the data was missing, however. To decide whether the missing data was likely
missing not at random (MNAR), and therefore possibly not useful without making additional assumptions,
we examined countries’ characteristics. We decided that observations for certain variables, countries or
groups of countries had to be excluded because they were not available; for instance, sometimes wars,
insufficiently developed institutions, social unrest or other reasons made the collection of data impossible.
We split the data set according to our assessment of whether the observation was MNAR or not. Data that
we regarded to be missing at random (MAR) (2.7% of the data set) was multiply imputed using Amelia
II (Honaker et al., 2011), taking the time-series cross-section structure of the data into account. We did
not impute data which was likely MNAR. However, some variables that were categorized as MNAR were
used in the analysis (e.g. CBI). As a result, we obtained observations for 60 countries, 13 points in time
(i.e. calendar years 1998-2010) for 19 measured variables (L1t∗ ,. . . ,L
7
t∗ ,L
9
t∗ ,. . . ,L
18
t∗ ,Yt∗ ≡ L8t∗ ,At∗). In this
final data set, 0.1% of observations were missing and thus imputed.
According to the World Bank’s income classification, roughly 20% of the remaining 60 countries are low
income countries, 36% belong to the lower-middle income category, 27% to the upper-middle income
category and 17% belong to the high-income category. From this country income distribution, we infer
that our results reflect the actual heterogeneity present across the world.
4.2 Target Parameters and Interventions
Our target parameters are ATEs as defined in (1). To be more specific, consider the following three
interventions, of which two are static and one dynamic, each of them applied to ∀t∗ ∈ {1998, . . . , 2008}:
d¯1t∗ = {at∗ = 1
d¯2t∗,i(L¯
8
t∗−1) =
{
at∗,i = 1 if m̂edian(L
8
t∗−1,i, . . . , L
8
t∗−7,i) ≤ 0 or m̂edian(L8t∗−1,i, . . . , L8t∗−7,i) ≥ 5
at∗,i = 0 otherwise
d¯3t∗ = {at∗ = 0
A country’s central bank is set to be either dependent or independent during the whole time period under
the first and third intervention above (i.e. d¯1t∗ and d¯
3
t∗). This means that we intervene on the first 11 (i.e.
from 1998-2008) out of 13 points (i.e. from 1998-2010) in time. This is because we assume a two-year
lag between the CBI intervention and its effect on inflation. The second (dynamic) intervention sets a
country’s central bank to be independent if its median inflation rate in the past 7 years was below 0%
or greater than 5%. The rationale for this relates to the fact that excessive inflation and deflation over
several years are considered to produce harmful effects on a country’s economy (see, e.g., Tobin (1965);
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Fisher (1933)). To guarantee price stability, which excludes inflation beyond a certain level and deflation,
an independent central bank is required. Over the last twenty years the optimal level of inflation has
been associated with roughly 2%. If a country’s inflation is constantly well above this level, in our case
5%, it will change the status of its central bank towards independence. The same holds for an inflation
rate systematically falling below a value of zero. Note that for the dynamic intervention d¯2t∗,i, data prior
to 1998 had to be collected and utilized.
We define the following two target parameters:
ψ1,3 = E(Y
d¯1
t∗
2010)− E(Y
d¯3
t∗
2010) , (4)
ψ2,3 = E(Y
d¯2
t∗
2010)− E(Y
d¯3
t∗
2010) . (5)
The first, ψ1,3, quantifies the expected difference in inflation two years after the last intervention (i.e. in
2010) if every country had an independent central bank for 11 years in a row compared to a dependent
central bank for 11 consecutive years. The second, ψ2,3, quantifies the effect that would have been
observed if every country’s central bank had become independent for time points where the country’s
median inflation in the preceding 7 years had been outside the range from 0 to 5, compared to a strictly
dependent central bank for 11 consecutive years (i.e. from 1998-2008).
4.3 Statistical and Causal Model (DAG)
We separate the measured variables into blocks. The first block comprises LAt∗ := {L1t∗ , . . . , L7t∗ , L9t∗ , . . . , L12t∗ }
and the second comprises LBt∗ := {L13t∗ , . . . , L18t∗ }. In line with Sections 3.2 and 3.3 we do not make any
overly restrictive assumptions with respect to our statistical model. First, we assume our data to come
from a general true distribution P0 and to be ordered such that
O = (Y1998,L
A
1998, A1998,L
B
1998, Y1999,L
A
1999, A1999,L
B
1999 . . . , Y2009,L
A
2009, A2009,L
B
2009, Y2010)
iid∼ P0 .
In the context of our application we do not need to make any deterministic assumptions regarding our
intervention assignment: a central bank can, in principle, be independent or dependent at any point in
time, irrespective of the country’s history - and thus be intervened upon.
As discussed in Section 3.4, we assume that each variable may be affected only by variables measured
in the past, and not those which are measured in the future. In addition, we make several assumptions
regarding the data-generating process which are summarized in the DAG in Figure 1. Not all variables
listed in O are needed during estimation, see Section 4.5.
10
C
on
su
m
er
P
ri
ce
s t
∗
(Y
t∗
)
C
on
su
m
p
ti
on
T
a
x
t∗
P
ri
ci
n
g
by
C
om
p
a
n
ie
s t
∗
P
ri
ce
M
a
rk
−
U
p
t∗
−1
M
a
rk
et
P
ow
er
t∗
−1
O
u
tp
u
t t
∗ −
1
(L
5 t∗
−1
)
S
a
v
in
g
s t
∗ −
1
A
g
e
S
tr
u
ct
u
re
t∗
−1
(L
1 t∗
−1
)N
om
in
a
l
W
a
g
es
t∗
−1
I
n
v
es
tm
en
ts
t∗
−1
T
ob
in
′ s
q t
∗ −
2
F
ir
m
s′
n
et
w
or
th
t∗
−2
A
S
&
M
H
t∗
−2
F
ir
m
s′
li
qu
id
. t
∗ −
2
A
ss
et
P
ri
ce
s t
∗ −
2
C
on
su
m
p
ti
on
t∗
−1
D
is
p
os
a
bl
e
I
n
co
m
e t
∗ −
1
T
a
x
es
a
n
d
S
oc
ia
l
S
ec
u
ri
ti
es
t∗
−1
W
ea
lt
h
t∗
−1
P
u
bl
ic
D
eb
t t
∗ −
2
(L
3 t∗
−2
)
P
u
bl
ic
D
eb
t t
∗ −
2
(L
3 t∗
−2
)
P
u
bl
ic
D
eb
t t
∗ −
1
(L
3 t∗
−1
)
D
eb
t
M
a
n
a
g
em
en
t t
∗ −
2
P
ri
m
.
B
a
la
n
ce
t∗
−1
(L
2 t∗
−1
)
F
is
ca
l
S
p
en
d
in
g t
∗ −
1
F
is
ca
l
R
ev
en
u
e t
∗ −
1
T
a
x
es
a
n
d
S
oc
ia
l
S
ec
u
ri
ty
t∗
−1
C
on
su
m
p
ti
on
T
a
x
t∗
−1
N
et
E
x
p
or
ts
t∗
−1
F
or
ei
g
n
O
u
tp
u
t t
∗ −
1
(L
4 t∗
−1
)
R
ea
l
E
x
ch
a
n
g
e
R
a
te
t∗
−2
T
ra
d
e
O
p
en
n
es
s t
∗ −
2
(L
1
0
t∗
−2
)
S
h
a
re
of
N
on
−
T
ra
d
a
bl
es
t∗
−2
P
a
st
I
n
f
la
ti
on
t∗
−2
(L
9 t∗
−2
)
C
on
su
m
er
P
ri
ce
s t
∗ −
2
(L
8 t∗
−2
)
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
C
os
t t
∗ −
1
N
on
−
L
a
bo
r
C
os
ts
t∗
−1
E
n
er
g
y
P
ri
ce
s t
∗ −
1
(L
7 t∗
−1
)
T
ec
h
n
ol
og
ic
a
l
P
ro
g
re
ss
t∗
−2
T
ec
h
n
ol
og
ic
a
l
P
ro
g
re
ss
t∗
−1
T
ec
h
n
ol
og
ic
a
l
P
ro
g
re
ss
t∗
,.
..
t+
8
L
a
bo
r
C
os
ts
t∗
−1
T
a
x
es
a
n
d
S
oc
ia
l
S
ec
u
ri
ty
t∗
−1
N
om
in
a
l
W
a
g
es
t∗
−1
B
a
rg
a
in
in
g
P
ow
er
t∗
−2
B
a
rg
a
in
in
g
P
ow
er
t∗
−1 L
a
bo
r
P
ro
d
u
ct
iv
it
y t
∗ −
1
L
a
bo
r
P
ro
d
u
ct
iv
it
y t
∗ ,
..
.t
+
8
O
u
tp
u
t
G
a
p
t∗
−1
(L
6 t∗
−1
)
L
a
bo
r
U
n
io
n
s t
∗ −
1
H
u
m
a
n
a
n
d
P
u
bl
ic
C
a
p
it
a
l t
∗ −
1
H
u
m
a
n
a
n
d
P
u
bl
ic
C
a
p
it
a
l t
∗ −
1
0
,.
..
,t
−2
P
a
st
I
n
f
la
ti
on
t∗
−2
(L
9 t∗
−2
)
I
n
f
la
ti
on
E
x
p
ec
ta
ti
on
s t
∗ −
2
(L
1
7
t∗
−2
)
C
B
C
re
d
ib
il
it
y t
∗ −
2
E
x
ch
a
n
g
e
−
R
a
te
R
eg
im
e t
∗ −
2
T
a
rg
et
in
g
R
eg
im
e t
∗ −
2
M
on
ey
S
u
p
p
ly
t∗
−2
(L
1
3
t∗
−2
)
C
B
T
ra
n
sp
a
re
n
cy
t∗
−2
(L
1
4
t∗
−2
)
C
B
I
n
d
ep
en
d
en
ce
t∗
−2
(A
t∗
−2
)
T
im
e
P
re
f
er
en
ce
t∗
−2
P
ol
.
I
n
st
it
. t
∗ −
2
(L
1
5
t∗
−2
)
P
ol
.
I
n
st
a
b.
t∗
−2
(L
1
6
t∗
−2
)
G
D
P
p
.c
. t
∗ −
2
(L
1
2
t∗
−2
)
M
on
ey
D
em
a
n
d
t∗
−2
C
on
su
m
er
P
ri
ce
s t
∗ −
2
(L
8 t∗
−2
)
M
on
ey
S
u
p
p
ly
t∗
−2
(L
1
3
t∗
−2
)
N
om
in
a
l
E
x
ch
a
n
g
e
R
a
te
t∗
−2
N
om
in
a
l
I
n
te
re
st
R
a
te
t∗
−2
R
ea
l
I
n
te
re
st
R
a
te
t∗
−2
M
P
D
ec
is
io
n
t∗
−2
C
a
p
it
a
l
O
p
en
n
es
s t
∗ −
2
(L
1
1
t∗
−2
)
C
u
rr
en
cy
C
om
p
et
it
io
n
t∗
−2
O
u
tp
u
t t
∗ −
2
(L
5 t∗
−2
)
N
om
in
a
l
I
n
te
re
st
R
a
te
t∗
−3
B
a
n
k
L
oa
n
s t
∗ −
2
(L
1
8
t∗
−2
)
C
on
su
m
p
ti
on
t∗
−1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
4
1
5
1
6
1
7
1
7
1
7
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
9
2
0
2
1
2
2
2
3
2
4
25
2
6
27
28
2
9
30
3
1
32
3
3
3
4
3
5
3
6
3
7
38
3
9
4
0
4
1
4
2
4
3
4
4
4
5
4
6
4
7
4
8
49
50
51
5
2
5
3
54
55
5
6
5
7
5
8
5
9
6
0
6
1
6
2
6
3
6
6
6
7
68
69
70
7
1
72
65
74
75
7
6
7
7
7
8
79
80
81
82
8
3
8
4
8
5
8
7
8
8
8
9
9
0
9
1
92
93
94
95
9
6
9
7
6
4
99
F
ig
u
re
1:
D
A
G
co
n
ta
in
in
g
th
e
st
ru
ct
u
ra
l
as
su
m
p
ti
on
s
ab
ou
t
th
e
d
at
a
ge
n
er
at
in
g
p
ro
ce
ss
fo
r
a
sp
ec
ifi
c
ti
m
e
p
o
in
t
t∗
=
2
0
0
0,
..
.,
2
0
1
0
.
T
h
e
ta
rg
et
q
u
a
n
ti
ty
is
ψ
j,
k
an
d
re
la
te
s
to
Y
2
0
1
0
w
h
ic
h
re
fe
rs
to
C
on
su
m
er
P
ri
ce
s t
∗
co
lo
re
d
in
gr
ee
n
.
T
h
e
in
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
ru
le
s
re
la
te
to
C
B
I
a
t
ti
m
e
t∗
,
co
lo
re
d
in
re
d
.
M
ea
su
re
d
co
va
ri
at
es
ar
e
gr
ey
,
an
d
u
n
m
ea
su
re
d
co
va
ri
at
es
ar
e
w
h
it
e.
A
ju
st
ifi
ca
ti
on
of
th
e
D
A
G
is
g
iv
en
in
A
p
p
en
d
ix
A
.2
.
11
The DAG summarizes our knowledge of the transmission channels of monetary policy. The intervention
node is red, the outcome green. The measured variables are visualized by grey colors and unmeasured
variables are white. An arrow A → B reflects our belief, corroborated by economic theory, that A may
cause B, whereas an absence of such an arrow states that we assume no causal relationship between the
respective two variables. Figure 1 has been developed based on economic theory. For example, arrow
number 6 describes the causal effect from real GDP (Output) on one component of companies’ price
setting (Price Mark-Up) which is motivated by the fact that changes in demand (c.p.) in the goods
market enable companies to set higher prices in a profit maximizing environment. Detailed definitions
of the considered variables, as well as detailed justification for the assumptions encoded in our DAG are
given in Tables 2 and 3 in the Appendix.
4.4 Identifiability Considerations
The DAG shows the causal pathways through which CBI can affect consumer prices, and thus ultimately
inflation. We next explain the main paths from the intervention node to consumer prices. An indepen-
dent central bank sets its policy tools autonomously in order to achieve its objective(s). Moreover, an
independent central bank is less pressured to pursue an overly expansionary monetary policy which would
produce only high inflation. Such a central bank is more likely to live up to its word which increases its
credibility (arrow: 74). Higher credibility keeps inflation expectations in check (arrow: 32). The more
contained inflation expectations are, the lower demands for nominal wage compensation will be (arrow:
75), which, in turn, keeps labor costs (arrow: 29), production costs (arrow: 23) and companies’ prices
(arrow: 3) low. At the end of the day this will also be reflected in relatively low consumer prices (ar-
row: 2). Another pathway from the intervention to the outcome acts through monetary policy decisions.
Following an intervention, monetary policy makers’ time preferences are reduced (arrow: 69) and this is
going to be taken into account in their monetary policy decisions (arrow: 49). Monetary policy decisions
are mirrored in money supply (arrow: 52), which is tantamount to banks’ loan creation (arrow: 66) and,
as a result, affect firms’ investment decisions (arrow: 67) and thus output (arrow: 11). The final stage
affects firms’ mark-ups (arrow: 6) in their prices with a final effect on consumer prices (arrow: 4 and 2).
There are several back-door paths from the intervention to the outcome. They all start with arrow 99
because CBI is influenced by past inflation which also affects current monetary policy decisions (arrow:
65). Monetary policy will in turn impact the formation of inflation expectations (arrow: 59) or the money
supply (arrow: 52). Along edges 66, 67, 11, 6, 4 and 2 this affects the outcome. Under the assumption that
the DAG as motivated in Appendix A is correct, establishing identification in terms of the (generalized)
back-door criterion requires the following considerations: some back-door paths that start with an arrow
from previous consumer prices into the intervention are subsequently blocked by the collider of monetary
policy decisions (that is, along the edges 99, 65, 56, etc.). Other back-door paths along the edges 99, 65,
etc. can be blocked by conditioning on the measured variable past inflation (L9t∗).
There are various paths from the intervention to the outcome that start with the edges 69, 49 and 52. All
those paths contain mediators one should not necessarily condition on in our example because otherwise
the effect of CBI on inflation through these paths would be blocked (Hernan and Robins, 2020). The
same considerations applies to the paths starting with the edges 74 and 32.
In summary, our DAG suggests that all back-door paths from At∗ to the outcome (that do not go through
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any future treatment node At∗+1) can be blocked by inclusion of past inflation into the analysis. As many
other variables lie on a mediating path from the intervention to the outcome (i.e. are descendants of At∗),
they should not be conditioned upon. A final consideration suggests that conditioning on past inflation
(to block all back-door paths) may also block the indirect effect of CBI on the future outcome along the
paths 72, 75 so that the estimation of the final effect that includes L9t∗ might be slightly conservative.
We argue that the developed DAG should serve as the basis for identification considerations and estimation
strategies. However, in complex macroeconomic situations violations of this causal model need to be taken
into account, and other estimation strategies may be useful as well. We now explain how this can be
facilitated.
4.5 Data-adaptive Estimation with longitudinal TMLE
We can, in principle, follow the algorithm described in Section 3.6 to estimate the target quantity of
interest. This includes estimation of the (nested) outcome model Q¯t∗ (step 1) and the intervention model
g0,At∗=d¯ls (step 3c), for each time point. That is, we can estimate the g-model for t
∗ = 1998, . . . , 2008 and
Qt∗ for t
∗ = 2000, . . . , 2010. As mentioned, the DAG assumes a 2-year lag before an independent central
bank can potentially affect the outcome. It is thus sufficient to estimate the first Q-model in 2000 given
the assumed lag-structure in the DAG. We define YT := Y2010 which corresponds to value for inflation in
2010 while d¯1t∗ , d¯
2
t∗,i(L¯
8
t∗−1) and d¯3t∗ are the interventions targeting CBI as described in Section 4.2.
We consider three approaches to covariate inclusion. The first is based on the identifiability considerations
related to our DAG, the other two refine variable inclusion criteria based on the scenario that some
structural causal assumptions in the DAG may be incorrect.
i) DAG-based approach (PlainDAG): Based on the identifiability arguments from Section 4.4, L¯t∗
contains only the relevant baseline variables from the year 1998 that were measured prior to the first
intervention node, as well as L8t∗ .
ii) Greedy super learning approach (ScreenLearn): This approach contains the full set of measured
variables Lt∗ . This approach assumes that each variable could potentially lie on a back-door path,
but that this was undiscovered due to mis-specification of the causal model. For example, a researcher
who argues that bank loans directly affect a central bank ’s independence (i.e. that there is an arrow
from bank loans to CBI) would have to consider a back-door path along the arrows 67, 11, 6, 4 ,2; and
thus include public debt into Lt∗ . Similarly, if it is doubted that some variables are not necessarily
mediators, but rather confounders on a back-door path that exists due to unmeasured variables, e.g.
CBI → unmeasured variable → Output → . . .→ Consumer Prices, then measured variables such as
Output (real GDP) would have to be included into Lt∗ as well. We suggest that an analysis that
includes all measured variables into Lt∗ can serve as a useful sensitivity analysis to explore the extent
to which effect estimates may change under different assumptions.
iii) Economic theory approach (EconDAG): A further approach, termed EconDAG, includes only
variables which are measured during a particular transmission cycle, as defined by our DAG. That
is, for the Q-model at t∗ every measured variable between t∗ − 2 and t∗ − 1 is included while for the
estimation of the g-model at t∗ only variables at t∗ and past intervention variables are considered.
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As above, given the assumed time-ordering, only variables from the past, and not from the future,
are utilized in the respective models.
Given the complexity of the data-generating process, it makes sense to use machine learning techniques
to estimate the respective g- and Q-models. For a specified set of learning algorithms, and a given set of
data, the method minimizing the expected prediction error (as estimated by k-fold cross validation) could
be chosen. As the best algorithm in terms of prediction error may depend on the given data set, it is often
recommended to use super learning instead – and this is what we use for i), ii) and iii). Super learning
(Van der Laan et al., 2007) (or “stacking”, Breiman (1996)) considers a set of learners; and instead of
picking the learner with the smallest prediction error, one chooses the convex combination of learners
which minimizes the k-fold cross validation error (for a given loss function, we use k = 10). The weights
relating to this convex combination can be obtained with non-negative least squares estimation (which is
implemented in the R-package SuperLearner, Polley et al. (2017)). It can be shown that this weighted
combination will perform asymptotically at least as well as the best algorithm, if not better (Van der
Laan et al., 2008).
As described in Section 3.6.1, the challenge of model specification, including the choice of appropriate
learners and screening algorithms, is to deal with the complex non-linear relationships in the data and
the p > n problem.
Our strategy is to use the following algorithms: the arithmetic mean; generalized linear models (with main
terms only, and also including all two-way interactions); Bayesian generalized linear models with an in-
dependent Gaussian prior distribution for the coefficients; classification and regression trees; multivariate
adaptive (polynomial) regression splines; generalized additive models; Breimans’s random forest; gener-
alized boosted regression modeling and single-hidden-layer neural networks. The algorithms are carefully
chosen to reflect a balance between simple and computationally efficient strategies and more sophisticated
approaches which are able to model highly non-linear relationships and higher-order interactions that may
be prevalent in the data. Furthermore, parametric, semi-parametric and non-parametric approaches were
applied to allow for enough flexibility with respect to committing to parametric assumptions. In partic-
ular, tree-based procedures were chosen to handle challenges that frequently come with economic data –
for instance outliers. In addition, since some of the continuous predictors are transformed by the natural
logarithm, this strict monotone transformation may affect its variable importance in a regression based
procedure while trees are not impaired in that respect.
For the strategies i)-iii), we use the following learning and screening algorithms:
a) Screening algorithms: Used only for estimation approach ii) because of the large covariate set
compared to the sample size; we used the elastic net (Zou and Hastie, 2005), the random forest
(Breiman, 2001), Cramer’s V (where either 4 or 8 variables selected at a maximum) and the Pearson
correlation coefficient. The screening algorithms were chosen such that at least a subset of them could
handle both categorical and quasi-continuous variables well.
b) Learning algorithms: The 11 learning algorithms which are mentioned above are the same for
estimations strategies i) and iii). i) and iii) where thus estimated with 11 algorithms each. In contrast,
strategy ii) benefited from the 5 screening algorithms mentioned in a) and we thus omitted Generalized
Boosted Regression Modeling from the learner set. In addition, learning algorithms that are applicable
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in the p > n case were added without prior screening to the 50 (= 5×10) algorithms. As a result, when
Breimanss Random Forest and Single-Hidden-Layer Neural Networks were added without screening,
52 algorithms could be used for strategy ii); see also Figure 4 in the Appendix.
4.6 Results
The results of our analyses are visualized in Figure 2.
Our main analysis (PlainDAG) suggests that if a country had legislated CBI for every year between 1998
and 2008, it would have had an average reduction in inflation of 0.82 (95% CI: -2.53; 0.89) percentage
points in 2010. The other two approaches led to similar results: -0.59 (95% CI: -2.48; 1.30) for ScreenLearn
and -0.59 (95% CI: -2.48; 1.29) for EconDAG.
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−0.59−0.59
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Figure 2: ψˆ1,3 and ψˆ2,3 for the three different treatment strategies
Similarly, if a country had legislated an independent central bank for every year when the median of
the past 7 years of inflation had been above 5% or below 0% from 1998 to 2008, it would have led
to an average reduction in inflation of 0.57 percent points (95% CI: -1.70; 0.59) in 2010 compared to
a dependent central bank (that is, dichotomized CBI = 0) for the same time span obtained from the
estimation strategy PlainDAG. The other two strategies led to similar conclusions.
Thus, if there is any inflation lowering effect from CBI, it is probably small. This is our main finding
from a monetary policy point of view.
Interestingly, all three estimation approaches lead to similar results.
The diagnostics for all analyses are given in Table 1. The cumulative product of inverse probabilities was
never below the truncation level of 0.01, which was re-assuring. The maximum value of clever covariates,
as defined in (3), was always well below 10, which suggests that the chosen super learning approach
worked well. However, the mean clever covariate – which is supposed to be broadly around 1 – was not
ideal for the dynamic treatment strategy 2, suggesting that ψ2,3 should be interpreted with care.
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ScreenLearn, ψˆ1,3 ScreenLearn, ψˆ2,3 EconDAG, ψˆ1,3 EconDAG, ψˆ2,3 PlainDAG, ψˆ1,3 PlainDAG, ψˆ2,3
Intervention A¯t∗ = d¯
3
t∗ A¯t∗ = d¯
1
t∗ A¯t∗ = d¯
3
t∗ A¯t∗ = d¯
2
t∗ A¯t∗ = d¯
3
t∗ A¯t∗ = d¯
1
t∗ A¯t∗ = d¯
3
t∗ A¯t∗ = d¯
2
t∗ A¯t∗ = d¯
3
t∗ A¯t∗ = d¯
1
t∗ A¯t∗ = d¯
3
t∗ A¯t∗ = d¯
2
t∗
Trunc. (%) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CC Mean 0.873 0.803 0.866 0.464 0.800 0.719 0.776 0.433 0.854 0.765 0.790 0.438
CC Max. 3.580 5.395 3.284 1.950 3.122 3.516 2.618 1.850 3.624 4.551 2.563 1.772
CC Mean Max. 0.970 0.954 0.934 0.510 0.867 0.947 0.801 0.450 0.907 0.878 0.873 0.482
CC Mean Min. 0.770 0.695 0.826 0.434 0.711 0.545 0.742 0.423 0.803 0.665 0.725 0.403
Table 1: Row 1: percentage of observation that had to be truncated because the cumulative product of
inverse probabilities was < 0.01. Rows 2 and 3: Mean and maximum value of the clever covariate. All
results are averages over the 5 imputed data sets. Rows 4 and 5 contain the minimum and maximum of
the five mean clever covariate values across the imputed data sets.
Figure 4 (Appendix) visualizes the learner weight distribution. In our analysis, a multitude of learners
and screening algorithms were important, including neural networks, random forests, regression trees and
Bayesian generalized linear models.
A naive analysis comparing the mean reductions in inflation between 2000 and 2010 between those coun-
tries that had an independent central bank (for 1998 to 2008) and those that a dependent central bank,
led to the following results: The mean reduction in inflation between 2000 and 2010 was 2.3 percentage
points for those with independent central banks, compared to 1.0 percentage points for those that had
dependent central banks. The difference in reduction was thus 1.3 percentage points (95% CI: -6.1; 3.5).
Such a crude comparison does however not permit a causal interpretation, and is not an estimate of ψ1,3.
5 Simulations
Motivated by our data analysis, we explore to what extent model mis-specification and choice of learner
sets may affect effect estimation with longitudinal maximum likelihood estimation (and competing meth-
ods).
5.1 Data-Generating Processes
We specified two data generating processes: a simple one with 3 time-points and one time-dependent
confounder; and a more complex one with up to 6 time points and 10 time-varying variables.
For the first simulation (Simulation 1 ) we assume the following time-ordering:
O = (L1, A1, Y1, L2, A2, Y2, L3, A3, Y3)
Using the R-package simcausal (Sofrygin et al., 2016), we define pre-intervention distributions as listed
in Table 4 (Appendix).
For the second simulation (Simulation 2 ) we use the following time-ordering:
O = (L11, A1, Y1, L
2
1, . . . , L
10
1 , . . . , L
1
5, A5, Y5, L
2
5, . . . , L
10
5 , L
1
6, A6, Y6)
We generated the pre-intervention data according to the distributions specified in Table 5 (Appendix).
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5.2 Target Parameter and Interventions
For both simulations we were interested in evaluating ATEs between two static interventions. That is,
we were interested in
d¯Sim1,1
t+
=
{
at+ = 1 for ∀t+ ∈ {1, 2, 3}
d¯Sim1,0
t+
=
{
at+ = 0 for ∀t+ ∈ {1, 2, 3}
and
d¯Sim2,1
t++
=
{
at++ = 1 for ∀t++ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
d¯Sim2,0
t++
=
{
at++ = 0 for ∀t++ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
The target parameters of interest are thus
ψ1 = E(Y
d¯Sim1,1t+
2 )− E(Y
d¯Sim1,0t+
2 ) , ψ2 = E(Y
d¯Sim2,1t++
6 )− E(Y
d¯Sim2,0t++
6 ) , (6)
5.3 Estimations
In our primary analysis, we use longitudinal targeted maximum likelihood estimation for both simula-
tions. In a secondary analysis, we also evaluated the performance of (longitudinal) inverse probability of
treatment weighting (see, e.g., Daniel et al., 2013 and the references therein).
For LTMLE, we considered four different estimation approaches, the first for the first simulation and
another three for the second simulation:
i) Estimation as explained in Section 3.6. Q- and g-models were fitted with (generalized) linear models.
This is estimation approach GLM.
ii) Estimation as explained in Section 3.6. Q- and g-models were fitted with a data adaptive approach
using super learning. There were four candidate learners: the arithmetic mean, GLM’s, Bayesian
generalized linear models with an independent Gaussian prior distribution for the coefficients, as well
as classification and regression trees. No screening of variables was conducted. This is estimation
approach L1.
iii) Estimation as explained in Section 3.6. Q- and g-models were fitted with a data adaptive approach
using super learning. The same four learners as in L1 are utilized; however variable screening
with Pearson’s correlation coefficient was conducted. In addition, four more learners were added:
multivariate adaptive (polynomial) regression splines (Friedman, 1991), generalized additive models,
generalized linear models including the main effects with all corresponding two-way interactions.
These additional four learners included variable screening with the elastic net (α = 0.75). This is
estimation approach L2.
iv) Estimation as explained in Section 3.6. Q- and g-models were fitted with a data adaptive approach
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using super learning. The eight learning/screening combinations from L2 were used. In addition
single-hidden-layer neural networks were used, once without variable screening and once with elastic
net screening. Finally, the last learner is composed of classification and regression with the random
forest after screening based on suitable variable importance measures. This is estimation approach
L3.
We also obtained estimates for the ATE based on IPTW. The estimation of the propensity scores was
identical to the estimation of the g-Models within LTMLE and is thus based on the estimation procedures
described in i)-iv) as well.
5.4 Comparisons
We compared the estimated absolute (abs.) bias and coverage probabilities for the estimated ATE’s for
the two simulations, and for both correctly and incorrectly specified Q-models (see details below).
i) Simulation 1: The incorrect, mis-specified, Q-models omit L := (L1, L2, L3) entirely. By contrast,
the g-models were specified such that the entire covariate histories are being taken into account. As
a result, if no screening is applied (estimation strategies GLM and L1), all relevant variables are used
for estimation; with screening (estimation strategies L2 and L3) some variables might be omitted,
however.
ii) Simulation 2: The incorrect, mis-specified, Q-models do not use L1 := (L11, L
1
2, L
1
3, L
1
4, L
1
5, L
1
6, L
1
7)
for estimation. Thus, one relevant back-door path remains unblocked which leads to time-dependent
confounding with treatment-confounder feedback. As for simulation 1, all g-models are specified such
that the entire covariate histories are taken into account.
5.5 Results
The results after 1000 simulation runs are summarized in Figure 3.
18
l l
ll
l
ll
l
Simulation 1 Simulation 2
Both Correct Q Incorrect Both Correct Q Incorrect
0
1
2
3
Ab
s.
 
Bi
as
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
Simulation 1 Simulation 2
Both Correct Q Incorrect Both Correct Q Incorrect
90.0
92.5
95.0
97.5
100.0
Co
ve
ra
ge
 P
ro
ba
bi
lity
 (%
)
Learner l l l lGLM L1 L2 L3
Figure 3: Absolute bias and coverage probability for both simulations – for correctly specified Q- and
g-models (Both Correct) and mis-specified Q-models (Q Incorrect) of LTMLE.
In simulation 1, LTMLE provides approximately unbiased estimates even under mis-specified Q-models.
This is because targeted maximum likelihood estimation is a doubly robust estimation and thus mis-
specification of either the Q- or g-models can be handled. However, the coverage probabilities are too
high. See Tran et al. (2018) for a discussion on this issue.
Under the more complex setup of simulation 2, there is small bias if both the Q- and g-models contain
the relevant adjustment variables (Both Correct) and learner set L1 is being used (Bias = 0.896, SE =
2.098). The more sophisticated learner sets L2 and L3 yield approximately unbiased estimates (Bias =
0.181 and 0.180; SE = 1.606 and 1.617). With incorrect specification of the Q-model, there is again small
bias, but still acceptable given the Monte-Carlo Error (Bias = 1.426, 0.698, 0.647; SE = 2.414, 2.100,
2.112). Interestingly, for simulation 2 the most complex estimation approach with the biggest learner set
L3 does not produce a substantial improvement compared to L2. This highlights that a simple increase
in learners does not necessarily improve finite sample performance of LTMLE; though a sufficient breadth
and complexity is certainly always needed as can be seen by the inferior performance of the first learner
set.
In simulation 1, anti-conservative confidence intervals lead to large coverage probabilities. However, in
simulaton 2, using L2 and L3 yields (close to) nominal coverage probabilities. Nevertheless, our results
highlight the need to develop more reliable variance estimators, such that overall better coverage can be
achieved.
Of note, while LTMLE produces approximately unbiased point estimates, IPTW does not seem to benefit
from complex estimation procedures of the propensity scores (g-models) in the second simulation. The
estimates are rather volatile, with some bias (but acceptable, as within the Monte-Carlo error), and poor
coverage probabilities. These conclusions hold for all learner sets considered (Appendix, Figure 5).
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6 Conclusions
We have shown that even for complex macroeconomics questions it is possible to develop a causal model
and implement modern doubly robust longitudinal effect estimators. We believe this is an important
contribution in light of the current debate on the appropriate implementation and use of causal inference
for economic questions (Imbens, 2019). Our suggestion was to commit to a causal model, justify it in
much detail (as in Appendix A.2), but also discuss possible violations of it, and ultimately to conduct
sensitivity analyses that evaluate effect estimates under different (structural) assumptions.
While the statistical literature has emphasized the benefits of doubly robust effect estimation in conjunc-
tion with extensive machine learning (Van der Laan and Rose, 2011), its use in sophisticated longitudinal
settings has sometimes been limited due to computational challenges and constraints (Schomaker et al.,
2019). We have shown how the use of screening and learning algorithms, which are tailored to the question
of interest, can help to facilitate a successful implementation of this approach.
As stressed by Imbens (2019): “[...] models in econometric papers are often developed with the idea that
they are useful on settings beyond the specific application in the paper”. We hope that both our causal
model, i.e. the DAG, as well as our proposed estimation techniques will be useful in applications other
than ours.
Our simulation studies suggest that LTMLE with super learning can yield good point estimates compared
to competing approaches, even under model mis-specification. However, both the coverage of confidence
intervals and the appropriate choice of learners are challenges that warrant more investigation. Recent
research confirms that the development of more robust variance estimators is urgently needed (Tran et al.,
2018), and learner selection becomes more diverse (Gehringer et al., 2018).
From a monetary policy point of view, we conclude that there is no strong support for the hypothesis
that an independent central bank necessarily lowers inflation, though our confidence intervals were wide.
Future research may investigate whether this finding holds for sub-groups of particular countries, such as
developing countries, and for different time periods.
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A More details on the causal model
A.1 Definition of the variables listed in the DAG
Node Explanation Emp. Approx.
Consumer Prices Price changes of the consumption basket of a representative household. Inflation (%)
Consumption Tax Value added tax on net price of goods and services. Unmeasured
Pricing by Companies Firms set their product prices based on production costs and mark-ups to maximize profit. Unmeasured
Price Mark-Up Surcharge on marginal cost. Depending on aggregate demand and market power. Unmeasured
Production Cost Convenient breakdown of unit costs in labor and non-labor costs. Generally depending on
the industry and countries’ development.
Unmeasured
Labor Costs Direct wages, salaries, labor taxes, and social security contributions. Unmeasured
Non-Labor Costs Capital, land and intermediate inputs such as intermediate goods, primary commodities and
energy.
Unmeasured
Energy Prices Mainly world market prices for energy resources like oil, gas and cole. En. Prices (USD)
Taxes and Social Secu-
rities
Labor taxes and social security contributions. Unmeasured
Market Power Perfect competition forces firms to set marginal costs equal to prices. This corresponds to a
lack of market power. By contrast, product differentiation suggests high market power.
Unmeasured
Output In a small open economy, the output consists of consumption, investments, government
spending and net exports.
GDP (USD)
Consumption Private consumption as share of disposable household income. This is divided into two
components: autonomous consumption and marginal propensity to consume.
Unmeasured
Disposable Income Consumer income after transfers and taxes. Unmeasured
Tobin’s q An economic measure which compares the market value of installed capital with the replace-
ment cost of installed capital. A value greater than 1 leads to new investments. If the value
is smaller than 1, purchasing existing capital is cheaper than investing in new capital.
Unmeasured
Investments Purchases of real estate by households and purchases of new capital goods (machines and
plants) by firms.
Unmeasured
Nominal Wage Employees’ salaries unrelated to the development of prices or indexation. Unmeasured
Bargaining Power Strength of bargaining position of employees in wage setting process. Unmeasured
Labor Unions Associations that represent the employed labor force in setting wage level, working conditions
and worker rights.
Unmeasured
Labor Productivity The ratio of output (GDP) to the number of workers. Unmeasured
Output Gap Fluctuations of current output (GDP) from its potential. Out. Gap (%)
Technological Progress A technological improvement resulting in higher machine productivity. Unmeasured
Human and Public
Capital
Expenses for discovering and developing new ideas and products. Unmeasured
Inflation Expectations Expected consumer price level changes approximated by a backward looking geometric mean
of inflation over the past three years.
Inflation (%)
Savings The sum of accumulated private (and public) savings. Savings can be negative. Unmeasured
Foreign Output World output (GDP) depending on foreign consumption, investments and fiscal spending. Unmeasured
Net Exports Defined as exports minus the value of imports. Unmeasured
Real Exchange Rate Determined by the nominal exchange rate, domestic and the foreign price level. Unmeasured
Nominal Exchange
Rate
Domestic currency in terms of foreign currency. Unmeasured
Fiscal Spending The sum of all government expenditures (on education, consumption, investments, etc.). Unmeasured
Fiscal Revenue The sum of fiscal earnings (mainly taxes). Unmeasured
Primary Balance Primary surplus/deficit: Government revenues minus government spending excluding interest
payments on outstanding debt.
Prim. Bal. (% GDP)
Public Debt If the government runs a primary deficit in a given year, debt increases. The increase in debt
is exacerbated by interest payments on existing debt.
Debt (% GDP)
Debt Management Decisions of a government on debt structure, potentially resulting in different currency, price
and interest-rate indexation composition as well as different maturities of newly issued and
outstanding debt.
Unmeasured
Money Demand Demand for money, defined as currency plus deposit accounts, determined by GDP and the
level of interest rates on bonds.
Unmeasured
Money Supply Different monetary aggregates (M0-M3) are available. For this analysis M2 was used. M2 Gr. (%)
Nominal Interest Rate The level of the interest rate is determined by the intersection of money supply and money
demand.
Unmeasured
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Targeting Regime Monetary policy strategy introduced in the 1990s aimed at stabilizing inflation at a pre-
announced point target or target range.
Unmeasured
Exchange-Rate Regime Monetary policy strategy aimed at stabilizing inflation at a level commensurate with that of a
strong currency. By pegging the currency to an anchor country’s currency, its monetary policy
and, hence, inflation is imported. Deviations from the target exchange rate are corrected by
purchases and sales of the pegged currency.
Unmeasured
Capital Openness Index measuring a country’s degree of capital account openness. Fin. Open.
AS & MH Adverse selection and moral hazard due to information asymmetries in credit markets. Unmeasured
Firms’ net worth A firm’s total assets minus its total liabilities yields its equity. Unmeasured
Firms’ liquidity Firms’ liquidity is directly linked to their cashflow. Cash is the most liquid asset and is used
to meet short-term liabilities.
Unmeasured
Age structure Demographic indicator that captures the share of the total population older than 65 years. Age 65 (%)
Trade openness The sum of imports and exports is set in relation to the country’s output. It is a proxy for
globalization.
Imports + Exports /
GDP
Asset Prices Prices of assets in which households, firms, or governments are able to hold wealth, such as
stocks, bonds, bank deposits, cash or real estate.
Unmeasured
Real Interest Rate The difference between the nominal interest rate and the expected rate of inflation. Unmeasured
Currency Competition Governments and central banks are forced to implement disciplined policies since they com-
pete with foreign currencies for capital. The primary mechanism through which greater
openness to foreign capital might lead to lower inflation arises presumably from its disciplin-
ing effect on monetary policy.
Unmeasured
CB Transparency Central banks publicly announce their forecasts, policy decisions and assessments of the
economy. A central bank’s transparency is strongly related to its accountability and its
credibility.
Transparency
CB Independence Independence of a central bank from governmental bodies. Measured via de jure (e.g.
statutes) indices, see main text for detailed explanations.
CBI
CB Credibility A central bank that does what it has announced publicly is considered to be credible. This
is reflected in inflation expectations that are low and stable.
Unmeasured
Pol. Instab. The percentage of veto players dropping from the government in any given year. In presiden-
tial systems, veto players are defined as the president and the largest party in the legislature.
In parliamentary systems, the veto players are defined as the Prime Minister and the three
largest government parties.
Pol. Stab.
Pol. Instit. The quality of political institutions. Civil Liberties
Time Preference Time horizon envisaged by policymakers within which they want to achieve a certain macroe-
conomic outcome. It may vary from a short (high time preference) to a middle- to long-term
perspective (low time preference).
Unmeasured
Share of Non-
Tradables
Distinction between tradeable and non-tradeable goods. Non-tradability means that a good
is produced and consumed in the same economy (e.g. haircuts).
Unmeasured
GDP p.c. GDP is the sum of all finished goods and services that are produced in a year. The p.c. term
divides this value by the number of citizens. GDP p.c. is a proxy for economic wealth and
living standards.
GDP pc (USD)
Bank Loans Commercial banks create money when they offer loans depending on the availability of central
bank reserves at their disposal.
Credit (% GDP) Gr.
Past Inflation Median of inflation during the past 7 years. Inflation (%)
MP Decision Monetary policy makers’ (i.e. central bankers’) decisions are contractionary, neutral or ex-
pansionary.
Unmeasured
Wealth Households’ wealth is accumulated savings over the last periods (can be negative in case of
net debt) and disposable income in the current period.
Unmeasured
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A.2 Justification for the arrows in the DAG
Arrow Causality Assumption Source
1 Consumer prices can change after changes in consumption taxes (e.g. VAT). Gelardi (2014)
2 Consumer prices are set individually by retailers and companies. Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, p. 290)
3 Production costs generally dominate the price setting process. Profit Margins strongly depend on industries. Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, p. 291)
4 Channels the aggregate demand side of the price setting process. In a small open economy demand shocks
on goods and services affect the price level.
Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, p. 312)
5 Higher product differentiation leads to higher market power and higher mark-ups in a profit maximizing
environment.
Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, p. 291)
6 Changes in aggregate demand in the goods market enable firms to set higher prices. Bloch and Olive (2001)
7 Expansionary monetary policy, which lowers nominal interest rates, also causes an improvement in firms’
balance sheets because it raises their cash flow. The rise in cash flow increases firms’ (or households’)
liquidity.
Mishkin et al. (2013, p.
544 f.)
8 In a small open economy domestic demand for goods and therefore output is also affected by net exports. Blanchard et al. (2010,
p. 125)
9 Fiscal spending describes the decision of the government to spend money. It affects output (GDP). Blanchard et al. (2010,
p. 45)
10 Private consumption also affects output. Blanchard et al. (2010,
p. 44)
11 Investments is another factor affecting output. Blanchard et al. (2010,
p. 44)
12 The share of disposable income that is not consumed in this period is saved based on the marginal propensity
to save.
Blanchard et al. (2010,
p. 52)
13 Governments undertake investments in human capital (e.g. education) or public capital (e.g. infrastructure)
to bolster long-run economic growth.
Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, pp. 85 ff.)
14 Tobin’s q unequal 1 gives incentives to invest or divest in capital and therefore affects aggregate investment. Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, p. 195)
15 Similar to arrow 13, companies and other non-governmental agents affect human capital. Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, pp. 85 ff.)
16 The current value of GDP may deviate from its potential. Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, p. 11)
17 Investments in human capital have a positive impact on innovation and economic development. Diebolt and Hippe
(2019)
18 Mainly training and education leads to high-skilled workers, and, in turn, to high productivity of the labor
force.
Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, pp. 85 f.)
19 Potential output growth is mainly determined by technological progress Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, p. 71)
20 Technological progress stands for higher productivity and higher productivity can again be expressed as
obtaining the same output with fewer inputs (here lower non-labor costs and higher profits)
Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, p. 71)
21 The first (second cf. 23) component that determines the production costs are non-labor costs. Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, p. 291)
22 Changes in energy prices channel through supply shocks and affect the non-labor costs of production. Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, p. 297)
23 The second component that determines the production costs are labor costs. Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, p. 291)
24 Gross hourly labor costs also include vacation, social security contributions and other benefits paid by
employers to the benefit of workers.
Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, p. 291)
25 Higher skills increase workers’ bargaining power in the wage setting process. Cahuc et al. (2006)
26 During boom periods, rising employment generally improves the bargaining position of workers. Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, p. 294)
27 Labor unions generally improve the bargaining position of workers. Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, p. 121)
28 A higher bargaining position leads to higher wage mark-up. Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, p. 294)
29 Nominal wages translate directly into labor costs. Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, p. 292)
30 Inflation expectations are built on publicly announced inflation targets. Gu¨rkaynak et al.
(2010)
31 Fiscal revenue increases the goverment’s capacity to spend. Walsh (2010, p. 136)
28
32 A credible central bank commitment to low and stable inflation anchors long-run inflation expectations. Bernanke et al. (2001)
33 Net exports depend positively on foreign output. Blanchard et al. (2010,
p. 125)
34 Wealth depends on disposable income. Heijdra and van der
Ploeg (2002, p. 136)
35 Disposable income is determined also by wages. Blanchard et al. (2010,
p. 43)
36 Fiscal spending affects the primary balance. Blanchard et al. (2010,
p. 439)
37 Current primary deficits are financed by new debt. Burnside (2005, p. 12)
38 Missale and Blanchard (1994) have introduced what they called effective maturity. Effective maturity
measures the sensibility of debt to unexpected inflation. The lower it is, the lower the impact of surprise
inflation on the value of the debt and the lower is the incentive to inflate.
Missale and Blanchard
(1994)
40 Exports depend negatively on the real exchange rate. Blanchard et al. (2010,
p. 125)
41 The real exchange rate is partly determined by the domestic price level. Blanchard et al. (2010,
p. 112)
42 Fiscal revenue affects the primary balance. Blanchard et al. (2010,
p. 439)
43 Investments are proportional to output. Higher output implies higher savings and, thus, higher investments. Blanchard et al. (2010,
p. 248)
44 The interest rate is determined by the equilibrium condition that the supply of money be equal to the
demand for money.
Blanchard et al. (2010,
p. 77)
45 The interest rate is determined by the equilibrium condition that the supply of money be equal to the
demand for money.
Blanchard et al. (2010,
p. 77)
46 ”An important feature of the interest-rate transmission mechanism is its emphasis on the real (rather than
the nominal) interest rate as the rate that affects consumer and business decisions. (. . . ) lower real interest
rates then lead to rises in business fixed investment, residential housing investment, inventory investment
and consumer durable expenditure, (. . . )”.
Mishkin et al. (2013, p.
537)
47 Investors face the choice between domestic and foreign assets and choose the investment with the highest
expected return.
Blanchard et al. (2010,
p. 119)
48 Fundamental for the determination of the real exchange rate is the nominal exchange rate. Blanchard et al. (2010,
p. 112)
49 The degree of central bank independence plays a meaningful role only if the central bank puts a different
emphasis on alternative policy objectives than the government. The literature points to two main differences.
One relates to possible differences between the rate of time preference of political authorities and that of
central banks. For various reasons, central banks are often more conservative and take a longer view of
the policy process than do politicians. The other difference concerns the subjective weights in the objective
function of the central bank and that of the government. It is often assumed that central bankers are more
concerned about inflation than about policy goals such as the achievement of high employment levels and
adequate government revenues.
Eijffinger and de Haan
(1996, p. 7)
50 Central banks publicly communicate their inflation target or range. One benefit of IT adoption is ”a well-
known and credible inflation target helps to anchor the private sector’s long-run inflation expectations”.
Svensson (2010, p.
1248)
51 Central banks publicly communicate when they peg their currency, which affects their credibility. Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, pp. 492 f.)
52 Central bank operations affect money supply. Mishkin et al. (2013,
pp. 301 ff.)
53 The government’s flow budget constraint means that today’s government debt is dependent on past debt
(and other items).
Burnside (2005, p. 36)
54 Given the breakdown of the relationship between monetary aggregates and goal variables such as inflation,
many countries have recently adopted inflation targeting as their monetary policy regime.
Mishkin (1999, pp. 590
f.)
55 Targeting the exchange rate is a monetary policy regime with a long history adopted by central banks. Mishkin (1999, p. 581)
56 Monetary authorities react to changes in the demand for money. Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, pp. 216-7)
57 Demand for monetary base M0 (money produced by the central bank) depends negatively on the nominal
interest rate.
Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, p. 217)
58 Demand for monetary base M0 depends positively on nominal GDP. Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, p. 217)
60 ”When stock prices rise, the value of financial wealth increases, thereby increasing the lifetime resources of
consumers, and consumption should rise.”
Mishkin et al. (2013, p.
542)
61 Savings lead to higher wealth. Cooper and Dynan
(2016)
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62 ”. . . , when monetary policy is expansionary, the public finds that it has more money than it wants and so
gets rid of it through spending. One place the public spends is in the stock market, increasing the demand
for stocks and consequently raising their prices.”
Mishkin et al. (2013, p.
542)
63 Tobin defines q as the market value of firms divided by the replacement cost of capital. Mishkin et al. (2013, p.
540)
64 Asset returns have a significant effect on household savings. Disney et al. (2010)
65 Central banks’ main objective is stable and low inflation. When inflation exceeds, or is expected to exceed
a certain level, a reaction by the central bank follows.
Taylor (1993)
66 ”. . . the bank lending channel of monetary transmission operates as follows: expansionary monetary policy,
which increases bank reserves and bank deposits, increases the quantity of bank loans available.”
Mishkin et al. (2013,
pp. 542 f.)
67 ”Because many borrowers are dependent on bank loans to finance their activities, this increase in loans will
cause investment (and possibly consumer) spending to rise . . . .”
Mishkin et al. (2013,
pp. 542 f.)
68 Central bank transparency is multidimensional, covering political transparency (openness about policy ob-
jectives), economic transparency (openness about data, models, and forecasts), procedural transparency
(openness about the way decisions are made, achieved mainly through the release of minutes and votes),
policy transparency (openness about the policy implications, achieved through prompt announcement and
explanation of decisions), and operational transparency (openness about the implementation of those deci-
sions). Transparency is a means of enhancing the credibility of central bank commitments.
Dincer and Eichen-
green (2014)
69 The most prominent argument for central bank independence is based on the time-inconsistency problem. It
arises when the best plan made in the present for some future period is no longer optimal when that period
actually starts. Implicitly, CBI reduces the time preference of monetary policy makers.
Eijffinger and de Haan
(1996, p. 5)
70 When a country becomes more open in economic terms, the nontraded sector becomes less important than
the traded goods sector.
Lane (1997)
71 The more important the traded good sector, the less the monetary authorities stand to gain from surprise
inflation because a monetary expansion in an open economy will be accompanied by a real depreciation of
the currency, raising costs for households and business. The larger the share of imported goods, the greater
the increase in inflation.
Lane (1997) and
Romer (1993)
72 Past Inflation can be considered as a summary statistic of past consumer price movements. By definition.
73 ”The hybrid Phillips curve is an example of how models used in the policy arena seek to overcome unsatisfac-
tory features of both the adaptive expectations Phillips curve (it is empirically successful, but is subject to
the Lucas critique; lacks micro-foundations and rational expectations; and lacks a channel for credibility to
affect inflation) and the NKPC (which is forward looking and therefore not subject to the Lucas critique; has
micro-foundations and rational expectations with a role for credibility, but counterfactual empirical predic-
tions). The hybrid Phillips includes forward-looking inflation expectations but acknowledges that inflation
appears to be persistent or inertial, i.e. that it depends on lagged values of itself....The hybrid Phillips curve
can be rationalized by the assumption that some proportion of firms use a backward-looking rule of thumb
to set their inflation expectations while the remainder use forward-looking expectations.”
Carlin and Soskice
(2015, p. 610)
74 One way for a central bank to establish credibility is by increasing its independence. Blinder (2000)
75 Employees want to protect themselves from a loss in purchasing power, so they embed their inflation expec-
tations into their nominal wages.
Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, p. 293)
76 ”Expansionary monetary policy, which causes a rise in stock prices along the lines described earlier, raises
the net worth of firms . . . ”.
Mishkin et al. (2013, p.
544)
77 ”The lower the net worth of business firms, the more severe the adverse selection and moral hazard problems
in lending to these firms. Lower net worth means that lenders in effect have less collateral for their loans,
so their potential losses from adverse selection are higher.”.
Mishkin et al. (2013, p.
544)
78 ”The lower net worth of businesses also increases the moral hazard problem because it means that owners
have a lower equity stake in their firms, giving them more incentive to engage in risky investment projects.
Because taking on riskier investment project makes it more likely that lenders will not be paid back, a
decrease in businesses net worth leads to a decrease in lending and hence in investment spending.”.
Mishkin et al. (2013, p.
544)
79 In a more integrated world, competition between currencies is even more present since countries want to
attract foreign investments and this race is exacerbated in a financially integrated world.
Wei and Tytell (2004)
80 The primary mechanism through which greater openness to foreign capital might lead to lower inflation is
presumably some sort of disciplining effect on monetary policy.
Wei and Tytell (2004)
81 The quality of political institutions might directly influence the relationship between CBI and inflation. The
effectiveness of CBI in strengthening credibility and enhancing inflation performance is increased by the
presence of multiple political veto players or if checks and balances are sufficiently strong.
Keefer and Stasavage
(2003) & Hayo and
Voigt (2008)
82 Political instability can have a number of possible effects. The most commonly discussed is that more
instability makes it difficult for policy makers to commit to low inflation.
Campillo and Miron
(1996, p. 10)
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83 Income per capita captures several possible effects. A higher level of income per capita is likely to be
accompanied by a more sophisticated tax system and a more developed financial system, both of which
imply lower optimal inflation tax and thus a negative relation with inflation. On the other hand, high-
income countries might be better at innovating technologies for reducing the costs of inflation, so their
inflation aversion might be lower.
Campillo and Miron
(1996, p. 11)
84 The life-cycle theory suggests that individuals plan their consumption and savings behavior over their life-
cycle and smooth out their consumption over lifetime. Aggregate demand and supply shift because certain
age groups and their particular economic behavior gain in relative importance to the rest of the population.
Hence, changes in the demographic structure can exert potentially large effects on total savings.
Bobeica et al. (2017, p.
5)
85 For given prices, nominal and real interest rates are directly linked through the Fisher equation. Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, p. 524)
87 ”Another balance sheet channel operates by affecting cash flow, the difference between cash receipts and
cash expenditures. The rise in cash flow increases the liquidity of the firm (or household) and thus makes
it easier for lenders to know whether the firm (or household) will be able to pay its bills. The result is that
adverse selection and moral hazard problems become less severe, . . . ”.
Mishkin et al. (2013, p.
544 f.)
88 Money demand depends on nominal output so that the price level becomes relevant. Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, p. 217)
89 & 90 The government collects its revenue also through tax payments. Walsh (2010, p. 136)
91 If the government runs a budget deficit by holding spending constant and reducing tax revenue, households
current disposable income rises and, perhaps, their lifetime wealth as well.
Elmendorf and
Mankiw (1999)
92 If the exchange-rate target is credible, it anchors inflation expectations to the inflation rate in the anchor
country to whose currency it is pegged.
Mishkin (1999, p. 581)
93 Pegging the exchange rate to a foreign anchor forces the country to adopt the foreign interest rate policy
which affects broad domestic money supply.
Mishkin (1999)
94 In an inflation (forecast) targeting framework, the central bank changes its short-term interest rate if the
inflation forecast exceeds or falls short of the inflation target, until the inflation forecast equals the target.
In a related version of the inflation targeting strategy, the central bank may deem appropriate to adjust its
monetary policy if the inflation forecast indicates a deviation from target (or its range). In either case, the
money supply will be affected.
Svensson (1997) and
Jordan et al. (2010)
95 A government that issues nominal debt has an incentive to promise low inflation ex ante in order to lower
nominal interest payments and then reduce the ex post value of the debt through unexpected inflation. This
incentive is stronger, the larger the public debt is.
Kwon et al. (2009)
96 Credit growth is a more important determinant of consumption than income growth. Bacchetta and Gerlach
(1997)
97 Capital and savings are usually valued by discounting. The amount of discount is mostly dependent on the
real interest rate.
Burda and Wyplosz
(2010, p. 161)
99 Central bank reform has been prompted by the failure of past anti-inflation policies coupled with a belief
that CBI will help deliver lower inflation in the future.
Crowe and Meade
(2008).
31
B Additional Material related to the Data Analysis
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Figure 4: Distribution of learner weights. The visualized distributions are based on the merged learner weights that resulted
from the estimation of Ψ1,3 and Ψ2,3 (d¯
1
t∗ , d¯
2
t∗ and twice d¯
3
t∗), summarized across the imputed data sets. The plotted point
represents the mean of each distribution. If it is below 0.01, both the distribution and the mean are displayed in red.
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C Details on the Simulation Study
C.1 IPTW
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Figure 5: Absolute bias and coverage probabilities for estimation with IPTW. Bias: 0.003 (GLM), 5.869 (L1), 5.779 (L2),
6.043 (L3); SE: 0.232 (GLM), 5.722 (L1), 5.717 (L2), 5.769 (L3).
C.2 Data-Generating Processes (DGP)
t = 1 t = 2, 3
Lt ∼ N(0, 0.25) Lt ∼ N(Lt−1 +At−1, 0.25)
At ∼ B(expit(Lt)) At ∼ B(expit(Lt + 2×At−1 − Lt−1))
Yt ∼ N(50×At + Lt, 0.25) Yt ∼ N(50×At + Lt + Lt−1 + Yt−1, 0.06)
Table 4: DGP for Simulation 1
t = 1 t = 2, . . . , 6
L1t ∼ N(0, 0.25) L1t ∼ N(L7t−1, 0.25)
At ∼ B(expit(L1t )) At ∼ B(expit(0.25× L1t + 0.25× L6t−1))
Yt ∼ N(At + L1t , 9) Yt ∼ N(At + L1t + L9t−1 + 0.05× L10t−1, 0.25)
L5t ∼ N(Yt, 2.25)
t = 1, . . . , 5 t = 1, . . . , 5
L2t ∼ N(At + L1t , 0.25) L5t ∼ N(Yt + L10t−1, 2.25)
L3t ∼ N(Yt + L2t , 1)
L4t ∼ N(At, 0.25)
L6t ∼ N(L4t , 0.25)
L7t ∼ N(L2t , 0.25)
L8t ∼ N(L5t , 0.25)
L9t ∼ N(L3t , 1)
L10t ∼ N(L8t + L9t , 0.25)
Table 5: DGP for Simulation 2
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